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THE ELEMENT OF SCIENTER IN ANTIFRAUD
PROVISIONS OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT
The commodities market is a rapidly growing investment forum for
the purchase or sale of contracts for specified amounts of a variety of
goods and services.1 Congress enacted the Commodity Exchange Act of
I CFTC v. Sterling Capital Co., 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at 24,777 (N.D.
Ga. 1981). Commodities trading and regulation essentially is a marketplace of speculation in
which investors seek to forecast the future and make profitable agreements based on their
prophecy. See Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 247-48 (1905)
(citing Holmes, J.), quoted in S. REP. No. 1131, 93rd CONG. 2d SESS. 24, reprinted in [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5843 [hereinafter cited as 1974 SENATE REPORT].
Commodity trading encompasses two basic transactions. H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d CONG.,
2d SESS. 41 (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787-5802 [hereinafter
cited as HOUSE REPORT]. The first category includes the current or spot market in which
private investors buy and sell virtually any commodity item, see note 2 infra, for which in-
terest and trading volume exists. HOUSE REPORT, supra, at 10, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. 8i AD.
NEWS at 5787. The second category includes the futures market in-which investors trade
contracts for commodities which are grown, produced, or otherwise made available at a
later time. Id. The futures market makes commodity trading unique and appealing to
investor-speculators, since the time element combined with frequent and unexpected
changes in supply and demand forces due to natural factors can produce substantial price
fluctuations. See Bianco, The Mechanics of Futures Trading: Speculation and Manipulation,
6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 27, 29-30 (1977). Futures contracts are adhesion contracts in which a
clearinghouse, as buyer or seller, is a party to the contract. Guttman, The Futures Trading
Act of 1978: The Reaffirmation of CFTC-SEC Coordinated Jurisdiction Over Security/Com-
modities, 28 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 16 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Guttman]. Futures contracts
are devices primarily for speculation, however, and actual delivery of the commodity involved
rarely occurs. Id. at 17.
Futures contracts are not technically sold or traded, but rather, investors form and
discharge the contracts on designated contract markets. See Clark, Genealogy and Genetics
of "Contract of Sale of a Commodity for Futur:e Delivery"in the Commodity Exchange Act,
27 EMORY L.J. 1175, 1175-77 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Clark]. Contract markets are boards
of trade that the Commodity Future Trading Commission (CFTC), see note 6 infra,
designates to trade futures. See Guttman, supra, at 18. A board of trade includes any ex-
change or association of persons engaged in the business of buying or selling any commodity
or receiving any commodity for sale on consignment. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979).
The Commodity Exchange Act, see note 2 infra, requires registration of all commodity
trading advisors, contract markets, and companies and individuals which handle commodity
investments or give trading advice. See id. § 6(f), (k), (n); note 10 supra (registration pro-
cedures).
Futures trading and volume increased from approximately 27.7 million contracts and
$571.6 billion in 1974 to approximately 41.5 million contracts and $1.1 trillion from July 1,
1976 to June 30, 1977. S. REP. No. 850, 95th CONG., 2d SESS. 13, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. &' AD. NEWS 2101; see Russo & Lyon, The Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Commodity
Futures .Trading Commission, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 57, 60 (1977) (recognizing substantial in-
crease in commodity futures trading in 1960's and early 1970's). The increased appeal of
futures trading is that significant profit and loss situations result on modest capital in-
vestments. See Dept. of Treasury and Federal Reserve Bd. Study of Treasury Futures
Markets, reprinted in [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,823 (May
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1936 (CEA) to regulate commodities trading.3 In an attempt to broaden
the scope of commodities regulation,4 Congress amended the CEA by the
14, 1979). Margin trading is the practice of paying only a fraction of the purchase price on a
futures contract. Id. Leverage occurs when an investor engages in margin trading on a
futures contract in the belief that a large profit will result. Id. "Hedging" occurs when a
businessman counterbalances a position in the current or spot market with a purchase in
the futures market in order to avoid the risk inherent in the spot market. Id. at 5799.
Options contracts are another form of commodity contract. See 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979). Commodity options give the holder the right but not the obligation to pur-
chase a specified amount of a commodity or a futures contract within a certain period of
time at a given price. CFTC v. United States Metals Depository Co., 468 F. Supp. 1149, 1155
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). See CFTC v. Goldex Int'l Ltd. [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L.
REP. (CCH) 20,839 at 23,439 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 1979) (detailed discussion of options trading).
Originally, all commodity contracts dealt with agricultural products. See Clark, supra,
at 1176 (discussion of evolution of changes in commodities contracts). Prior to the enactment
of the Commodity Futures Trading Act of 1974 (1974 Act), Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389
(codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976)), commodities regulated by the Department of
Agriculture, see note 3 infra, primarily were agricultural products. See H.R. REP. No. 975,
93d Cong., Sess. 41, 110 CONG. REC. 11420 (1974) (list of regulated commodities prior to 1974).
Since 1974, the CFTC has been responsible for regulation of commodities. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2,
4a (1976 & Supp. 111979); note 6 infra. Regulated commodities now include commonly traded
agricultural products and all goods and services provided for on the future contract market.
7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); see 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra, at 8, [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5843, 5890 (list of regulated commodities since 1974).
2 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
' Id.; see Rainbolt, Regulating the Grain Gambler and His Successors, 6 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1, 7-8 (1977) (tracing history of organized commodity regulation in United States)
[hereinafter cited as Rainbolt]. The Grain Futures Act of 1922 (1922 Act), PUB. L. No. 331, 42
Stat. 988 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976)), was the first federal legislation to
regulate commodity trading. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976); see Rainbolt, supra, at 7-8. The 1922
Act contained only sparse regulatory provisions. Rainbolt, supra, at 8. Although the 1922
Act empowered the Department of Agriculture to regulate commodities, the Act did not
control unnecessary, fraudulent, or destructive speculation. Id.; see 7 U.S.C. § la (1976).
Recognizing that the 1922 Act left trading abuses uncontrolled, President Roosevelt called
for the enactment of legislation providing for federal regulation of exchange operations for
the protection of investors, the safeguarding of values, and elimination of detrimental prac-
tices. Rainbolt, supra, at 8-9 n.38; see H.R. REP. No. 241, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 78 CONG.
REC. 2264 (1934) (President Roosevelt's call for better regulation of commodities market).
Roosevelt's efforts resulted in passage of the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (1936 Act),
Ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976)). See Rainbolt, supra, at 9.
The 1936 Act altered the structure of the 1922 Act. Id. The 1936 Act transferred the
power to regulate commodities trade from the Department of Agriculture specifically to the
Secretary of Agriculture. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 7a, 7b, 9 (1976). The Secretary of Agriculture ad-
ministered provisions of the 1936 Act by requiring exchanges and brokerage houses dealing
with commodities to register with his office. Id. §§ 6d, 6f-6g, 7a, 7a(1)-(7). Most importantly
in the 1936 Act, Congress inserted section 4b, an antifraud provision.designed to protect the
fiduciary relationship between brokers and customers arising in commodities transactions.
Id. § 6b; see note 20 infra (text of section 4b). Since 1936, Congress twice has amended the
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). See note 6 infra.
' See 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 11-15, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5843, 5852-56 (tracing history of federal regulation of commodity futures trading); Guttman,
supra note 1, at 9-11 (discussing delayed federal response to regulating growing commodity
market).
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Commodity Futures Trading Act of 1974 (1974 Act).' In the 1974 Act,
Congress created the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).
6
' PUB. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (codified at7 U.S.C. §§ 1-22 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
See Purcell & Valdez, The Commodity Futures Trading Act of 1974: Regulating Legislation
for Commodity Futures Trading in a Market-Oriented Economy, 21 S.D. L. REV. 555, 559-65
(1976). Congress enacted the 1974 Act to insure fair practice and honest dealing on commodi-
ty exchanges and to control speculation in order to prevent injury to producers, consumers,
and market professionals. 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 18, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 5856. Prior to enacting the 1974 Act, Congress found that commodity
trading was taking place in large volume by the general public as well as by those engaged
in buying and selling commodities in interstate commerce. Id., [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5856. See generally Hudson, Customer Protection in the Commodity Futures
Market, 58 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1978). Congress found that under the 1936 Act, see note 3 supra,
transactions and prices in commodities trade were susceptible to manipulation, control,
speculation and unreasonable price fluctuations. 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 18,
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5856. See generally McDermott, Defining Manipula-
tion in Commodity Futures Trading: The Futures "Squeeze", 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 202 (1979).
Congress further amended the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 by the Futures
Trading Act of 1978 (1978 Act). Pub. L. No. 95-405, 92 Stat. 865 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6c &
6d (Supp. 11 1979)); see note 25 infra.
The 1978 Act expands the protections available to commodity traders and investors.
See 7 U.S.C. § 21 (Supp. II 1979). The 1978 Act provides that persons trading in com-
modities may establish voluntary associations to regulate the trading practices of associa-
tion members. Id. Under the 1978 Act, Congress also created a cause of action in favor of
the states. Id. § 13a(2). States now may seek injunctive relief for violations of the Commodity
Exchange Act on behalf of state residents. Id. If a person dealing in commodities appears to
have violated the interest of a state resident under the Act, a state may bring an action in
federal district court on behalf of the state resident to enjoin the violation, enforce com-
pliance with the Act, and recover money damages. Id. See generally Schneider & Santo,
Commodity Futures Trading Commission: A Review of the 1978 Legislation, 34 Bus. LAW.
1755 (1979). Congress has not yet created a private cause of action for investors in federal
courts to redress violations of the Act. See Recent Developments in Commodities Law-Im-
plied Private Rights of Action Under the Commodities Acts, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 986,
997 (1980) (no implied private right of action under §§ 4c(B) and 4c(D) of CEA) [hereinafter
cited as Recent Developments].
' See 7 U.S.C. § 4a (1976 & Supp. II 1979). The 1974 Act established the CFTC and
granted the agency exclusive jurisdiction over futures trading and regulation of all com-
modities. See id. §§ 2, 4a. The CFTC contains five members appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate. Id. Commissioners of the CFTC serve staggered five
year terms. Id. See generally Greenstone, The CFTC and Government Reorganization:
Preserving Regulatory Independence, 33 Bus. LAW. 164, 185-201 (1977) (legislative history
of CFTC formation) [hereinafter cited as Greenstone]; Note, The Role of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Under the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of
1974, 73 MICH. L. REV. 710, 711 (1975) (same) [hereinafter cited as Role of Commodity Com-
mission].
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) asserted jurisdiction over unregulated
aspects of the commodities industry prior to 1974. Guttman, supra note 1, at 11-13. Congress
enacted the 1974 Act to clarify the status of jurisdiction over commodities trading. Id. The
1974 Act preempted the SEC from regulating commodities under securities law. Id. The
"exclusive" jurisdiction over commodities that Congress granted to the CFTC supercedes
that of the SEC, the states, and other federal agencies. 1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2,
14, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5858; cf. Note, Discretionary Commodity Ac-
counts: Are They Securities and Does it Really Matter?, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 843,
844-46 (1981) (discussion of whether CTFC's jurisdiction preempts that of SEC over discre-
tionary commodity accounts) [hereinafter cited as Commodity Accounts].
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The CFTC, an independent federal regulatory agency,' is responsible for
interpreting the CEA and promulgating rules governing commodities
trade.'
Regulation of fraud in commodities transactions has proven to be a
particularly difficult task for the CFTC.9 The difficulty stems from the
fact that regulation of commodity fraud tracks regulation of fraud in the
' See Rainbolt, supra note 3, at 21. The scope of the 1974 Act indicates that Congress
recognized a centralized and strong role for the CFTC as an independent, self-regulatory
agency. Id. The CFTC is "self-regulatory" insofar as it may review the competence of com-
modity exchanges, withdraw or suspend an exchange's designation, deny potential in-
vestors access to the market, seek injunctions and levy penalties to enforce its provisions,
and refer violations of the Commodity Exchange Act to the Department of Justice. See 7
U.S.C. §§ 12c, 13a (review competence); 7b, 8a (withdraw designation); 19, 12c (deny access);
13a(1) (enforcement provisions); 13a (refer violations) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The duty of
self-regulation additionally extends to each individual commodity exchange. Id. §§ 7a, 7b.
For a discussion of the CFTC's and the individual commodity exchanges' duty to conduct
comprehensive and effective self-regulation, see HOUSE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, REPORT ON
H.R. 13113, H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 44-48 (1974). See also Case & Co. v. Board
of Trade, 523 F.2d 355, 362 (7th Cir. 1975); Johnson, Self-Regulation: A Primer on the
Perils, 27 ADEL. L. REV. 387 (1975).
The CFTC is an "independent" federal agency insofar as it operates without oversight
from the Department of Agriculture or any other federal agency with the exception of Con-
gress. 7 U.S.C. § 4a (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The CFTC has broad independent regulatory
authority. Johnson, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Ackr Preemption as
Public Policy, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Preemption]. Congress
has provided only general standards for the CFTC to follow in the administration of com-
modities trade policy, encouraging agency independence. Id. ; see text accompanying notes
140-42, 154-55 infra. (discussion of CFTC's need to establish approach to commodities regula-
tion distinct from securities regulation). See generally Greenstone, supra note 6, at 165-68
(discussing regulatory independence of CFTC).
8 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 7b, 9, 13a, 13a(1) (1976 & Supp. II 1979). The CFTC may sus-
pend or revoke a commodity exchange's right to operate if the exchange fails or refuses to
comply with the Commodity Exchange Act or the rules, regulations, and orders that the
CFTC has promulgated thereunder. Id. § 7b. The CFTC may bring administrative pro-
ceedings against any contract market, see note 1 supra, that fails to enforce.CFTC rules or
regulations. Id. § 13a. If the CFTC has reason to believe that any person has manipulated
the market price of a commodity or commodity futures contract, and has made a material
misrepresentation in filings with the CFTC or in prospective customer literature, or has
otherwise violated the Act, the CFTC may enjoin future violations, suspend or revoke that
person's right to trade, and assess a penalty of not more than $100,000 for each violation. Id.
§ 9. The CFTC or the Attorney General may bring an action in federal district court to en-
join violations of the Act or to enforce compliance with the Act's provisions. Id. § 13a-1; see
CFTC v. Premex, Inc., 655 F.2d 779, 781 (7th Cir. 1981) (CFTC brings civil contempt action
to enforce rule 30.03 of Act); text accompanying notes 172-248 infra (discussion of CFTC v.
Premex, Inc.); notes 5-8 supra (inception and role of CFTC).
' See Nathan & Spindel, "I'm Guilty of What?"-Emerging Concepts of Commodities
Fraud, 35 Bus. LAW. 811, 812 (1980) (survey of CFTC enforcement methods for fraud viola-
tions). For a critical discussion of the problems of commodity fraud regulation and the
CFTC's performance, see Knight, CFTC Head Outlines Plans To Prevent Commodity
Fraud, Wash. Post, Feb. 24, 1982, at D1, col. 1 (Senate hearings concerning CFTC effec-
tiveness); Knight, Commodity Unit Found Failing to Detect Fraud, Wash. Post, Feb. 23,
1982, at Al, col. 1 (criticism of CFTC's ineffectiveness); Bosley, The Assault on the Futures
Industry, COMMODITIES, Nov. 1977, at 42 (criticism of CFTC's performance). But see
Sullivan, The Future of Futures Regulation, Wash. Post, Oct. 28, 1977, at B6, col. 5; id., Oct.
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securities market."0 The antifraud provisions contained in the CEA and
the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 (1934 Act) are similar both in
language and in statutory construction. 2 Whether scienter3 is an ele-
27, 1977, at D10, col. 1; id., Oct. 26, 1977, at El, col. 5; id., Oct. 25, 1977, at D7, col. 5 (positive
assessment of CFTC's performance and problems associated therewith).
" See Wolff, Comparative Federal Regulation of the Commodities Exchanges and the
National Securities Exchanges, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 223,224 (1969) (comparison and over-
view of regulation of domestic commodities and securities markets); note 9 supra (SEC
jurisdiction over commodities prior to 1974). Historically, federal regulation linked the com-
modities industry and the securities industry due to jurisdictional overlaps. Bromberg,
Commodities Law and Securities Law-Overlaps and Preemptions, 1 J. CORP. L. 217,
218-24 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Bromberg]. The congressional grant of exclusive jurisdic-
tion to the CFTC over commodity futures in the 1974 Act preempted SEC regulation and
established an independent basis for commodities regulation apart from securities regula-
tion. See Preemption, supra note 7, at 35-37. The fraud provisions of securities law differ
from the provisions of commodities law. See Bromberg, supra, at 287-95. Securities law pro-
vides for private rights of action for defrauded investors and contains strict registration re-
quirements for all security traders. Hewitt, The Line Between Commodities and
Securities-Part 1, 1 AGRIC. L.J. 291, 320 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Hewitt]; see Mullis v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 1345, 1350-51 (D. Nev. 1980)
(private action under securities law); Westlake v. Abrams, 504 F. Supp. 337, 345 (N.D. Ga.
1980) (same); Commodity Accounts, supra note 6, at 849. But cf. Preemption, supra note 7,
at 36 (no private action available under securities law). Sections 5 and 6 of the 1933 Act pro-
scribe the sale of unregistered securities and describe methods of proper registration with
the SEC. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77f (1976).
Whether implied private rights of action exist under commodities law is still the sub-
ject of much debate among courts. See Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., __ U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 1971 (1981); Leist v. Simplot, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
21,051 at 24,189 (2d Cir. 1980) (implied private right of action under CEA). But see Stone v.
Saxon & Windsor Group, Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder) COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
21,000 at 23,885 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (no implied private right of action under CEA). The Com-
modity Exchange Act also does not make registration of commodity accounts with the
CFTC mandatory. See Preemption, supra note 8, at 40-41. The CFTC regulates commodity
accounts and futures contracts by regulating the contract markets in which investors trade
the accounts. Id.; see note 1 supra (contract markets). Commodities law, however, does pro-
vide for CFTC enforcement proceedings against alleged defrauders, see note 8 supra, and
administrative reparations proceedings for private parties aggrieved by violations of the
Commodity Exchange Act. See Graham, Special "Reparations" Actions, 35 Bus. LAW. 773,
774 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Graham]. Aggrieved parties may bring complaints for alleged
violations of the Act before the CFTC in a reparation proceeding. 7 U.S.C. § 18a (1976). The
CFTC may award money damages upon finding a violation of the Act. Id. § 18c. The final
determination in a CFTC reparation proceeding is not subject to de novo review by federal
or state courts. Id. § 18g. CFTC reparations proceedings have no counterpart in securities
law. Graham, supra, at 774.
' 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
1 Hewitt, supra note 10, at 321 n.169. Commentators have noted that commodity anti-
fraud provisions are similar to securities antifraud provisions. See id.; Bromberg, supra
note 10, at 76-77 & n.240; Preemption, supra note 7, at 36-38. See generally Nathan, The
Continued Relevance of the Securities Laws to Certain Commodity-Related Transactions,
COMMODITIES AND FUTURES TRADING 201, 213-14 (Prac. Law. Inst. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Nathan].
's See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976); note 68 infra (discussion of
Hochfelder). The Supreme Court in Hochfelder used the term "scienter" to refer to a mental
state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud. 425 U.S. at 193 n.12. The court
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ment of proof under antifraud provisions of the CEA and the 1934 Act is
subject of much judicial dispute.14 Courts have addressed the issue of
scienter more extensively under the securities antifraud provisions than
under the comparable provisions of commodities law. 5 In addition,
courts and parties to commodity fraud litigation often rely on securities
case law to resolve questions of fraud under the CEA.' Consequently,
the CFTC, as a regulatory agency independent of the SEC, has had prob-
lems fashioning its own approach to the regulation of commodity fraud. 7
The CFTC and the courts have been unable to achieve a uniform ap-
proach to scienter in terms of effective application of the commodities
antifraud provisions. 8
noted that requisite scienter is something less than specific intent, yet more than
negligence. Id.; see 1978-1979 Securities Law Developments: Rule 10b-5, 36 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 845, 923 (1978) (scienter requirements); Note, Rule 10b-5 Liability After Hochfelder:
Abandoning the Concept of Aiding and Abetting, 45 U. CAL. L. REV. 218, 231 (1978) (specific
intent to defraud not element of scienter). See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 154, at 669-700 (4th ed. 1971) (scienter characterizes three states of mind: (1) know-
ing; (2) without belief in the truth; (3) reckless) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
" Johnson, Applying Hochfelder in Commodity Fraud Cases, 20 B.C. L. REV. 633, 635
(1978). Compare Gordon v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
21,016, at 23,981 (CFTC Apr. 10, 1980) (scienter not element of action under § 4b(A) of CEA)
and SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612, 623 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (scienter not
element of action under § 10(b) of 1934 Act) with CFTC v. Sterling Capital Co., 2 COMM. FUT.
L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at 24,787 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 20, 1981) (scienter required in actions under
§ 4b(A) of CEA) and SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1332-33 (5th Cir. 1978) (scienter required'in
actions under § 10(b) of 1934 Act). See text accompanying notes 33-161 infra.
"' Hewitt, supra note 10, at 321. Although commodities regulation in terms of the 1922
Act, see note 4 supra, historically predates that of securities regulation by the Securities
Exchange Act of 1933 (1933 Act), 7 U.S.C. §§ 7a-77aa, commodities case law is less developed
than securities case law. Hewitt, supra note 10, at 321. Underdevelopment of commodities
law is due to the fact that no centralized regulatory authority overseeing commodity trade
existed until Congress established the CFTC in 1974. See id.; notes 6-8 supra (inception of
CFTC). Fraud is an example of one area in which courts have construed the provisions of
securities law more thoroughly than similar commodities law provisions. Comment, Reflec-
tions of 10b-5 in the "Pool" of Commodity Futures Antifraud, 14 HouS. L. REV. 899, 902
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Commodity Futures Antifraud]. The underdevelopment of com-
modities fraud case law may be a result of Congress' only recent amendments to the Com-
modity Exchange Act in 1974 and 1978 which emphasized the development of antifraud
measures. See Hewitt, supra note 10, at 321; note 5 supra (1974 and 1978 amendments to the
CEA).
"s Hewitt, supra note 10, at 321-22. Securities antifraud case law is more fully
developed than commodities fraud law. See note 17 supra . Consequently, courts often
analogize to or rely upon the developed body of securities law rather than less developed
commodities precedents to resolve commodity problems. Hewitt, supra note 10, at 321; see,
e.g., CFTC v. Sterling Capital Co., 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,169, at 24,786-87 (N.D.
Ga. Feb. 20, 1981); Gordon v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
21,016, at 23,979-80 (CFTC Apr. 10, 1980).
"7 See Hewitt, supra note 10, at 322; Preemption, supra note 7, at 35-36 (recognizing
difficulty in and need for development of independent body of commodities law); Commodity
Accounts, supra note 8, at 861-62 (same).
8 See text accompanying notes 19-161 infra; note 9 supra.
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I. SCIENTER AND PROOF OF FRAUD UNDER SECTION 4b(A) OF THE
CEA AND CFTC AND CFTC RULE 32.9
The basic antifraud provision of the CEA is section 4b which pro-
hibits any person making or connected with making futures contracts 19
from cheating, defrauding, or willfully deceiving others." Section 4021 of
the CEA prohibits commodity trading advisors' or pool operators" from
defrauding any client or prospective client.24 Under section 4c, Congress
granted the CFTC the power to prohibit the sale of commodity options.25
Section 4c, unlike other commodity antifraud provisions,26 contains no
" See note 1 supra.
7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979). Section 4b of the Commodity Exchange Act
provides, in pertinent part, that it is unlawful for any person connected with making a
futures contract for or on behalf of another...
(A) to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud such other person;
(B) willfully to make or cause to be made to such other person any false
report or statement thereof, or willfully to enter or cause to be entered for such
person any false record thereof;
(C) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive such other person by any means
whatsoever in regard to any such order or contract or the disposition or execution
of any such order or contract, or in regard to any agency performed with respect
to such order or contract for such person; or
(D) to bucket such order, or to fill such order by offset against the order or
orders of any other person, or willfully and knowingly ....
Id.
21 7 U.S.C. § 6o (1976 & Supp. II 1979). Section 4o of the Commodity Exchange Act
provides that any commodity trading advisor or pool operator, either directly or indirectly,
shall not "employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud" any client or prospective client
or "engage in any transaction, practice or course of dealing" which defrauds or deceives any
client or prospective client. Id.
' Id. § 2. The term "commodity trading advisors" in section 4o of the Commodity Ex-
change Act includes any person who engages in the business of advising others, either
directly or through publications, as to the value of commodities or trading in commodity
futures. Id.; see id. § 6o (§ 4o of CEA). The term excludes persons whose advertising
concerning commodities is done only incidentally for business purposes. Id. § 2.
" Id. § 2. The term "pool operators" in section 4o of the Commodity Exchange Act in-
cludes any person who solicits funds or property from others for an investment trust or syn-
dicate for the purpose of trading in any commodity for future delivery. Id.; see id. § 6o (sec-
tion 4o of CEA). A commodity pool is similar to a mutual fund in that it requires investors to
contribute to a common fund in which an account executive trades. Gravois v. Fairchild,
Arabatzis, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,706, at 22,870 (E.D.
La. Nov. 9, 1978).
" See note 21 supra (provisions of § 40 of CEA).
" Id. § 6c. In the Futures Trading Act of 1978, see note 5 supra, Congress prohibited
transactions in commodity options. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6c, 6d (Supp. m 1979). In section 6c(C) of
the Commodity Exchange Act, Congress codified the CFTC's rule 32.11 which made the
solicitation and sale of commodity options unlawful after June 1, 1978. Id. § 6c(C); 17 C.F.R.
§ 32.11 (1981). See generally CFTC v. Morgan, Harris & Scott, Ltd., 484 F. Supp. 669
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (discussing ramifications of ban on options trade). The CFTC permits certain
businesses to continue to purchase options for use in connection with their business under a
trade option exemption. See 17 C.F.R. 32.4 (1981).
Compare 7 U.S.C. § 6c (1976 & Supp. I 1979) (general language concerning ban on
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substantive conduct standards.27 Subsequent to the enactment of section
4c in 19748 and under the authority of section 4c(B),9 the CFTC pro-
mulgated rule 32.90 prohibiting fraud related to the offer and sale of
commodity options." Rule 32.9 prohibits conduct that cheats, defrauds,
or deceives any person in connection with commodity option transac-
tions.32
Neither the provisions of the CEA nor the rules that the CFTC has
promulgated thereunder explicitly require scienter to sustain fraud
violations.' The majority of courts have held that commodity antifraud
provisions required proof of intentional conduct to sustain a claim of
fraud. 4 Recent cases, however, have focused on whether scienter is a re-
quirement for fraud violations under section 4b(A) and 4c(B) of the CEA
and rule 32.9.11
In Gordon v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc.,"6 the CFTC determined
options trade) with 7 U.S.C. §§ 6b, 6o (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (specific proscriptions against
fraudulent conduct associated with commodity sales and trading).
7 U.S.C. § 6c (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
See note 25 supra.
7 U.S.C. § 6c(B) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Section 4c(B) of the CEA gives the CFTC
jurisdiction to regulate by its own terms transactions having the character of an "option."
Id.; see CFTC v. Crown Colony Commodity Options, Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 911, 914 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); note 25 supra.
17 C.F.R. § 32.9 (1981).
31 Id.; see note 25 supra.
17 C.F.R. § 32.9 (1981).
See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 6b, 6c, 6o (1976 & Supp. III 1979); 17 C.F.R. § 32.9 (1981). See
Commodity Futures Antifraud, supra note 15, at 900-902 (scienter requirement in com-
modities antifraud provisions subject to various interpretations).
I See Master Commodities, Inc. v. Texas Cattle Mgmt. Co., 586 F.2d 1352, 1356 (10th
Cir. 1978) (private civil suit under § 4b of CEA requires scienter); Haltmier v. CFTC, 364
F.2d 556, 562 (2d Cir. 1977) (proof of evil motive necessary to prove fraud); Silverman v.
CFTC, 549 F.2d 28, 31 (7th Cir. 1977) (§ 4b violations of CEA require proof of scienter).
The CFTC in Gordon v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., see note 36 infra, did not rely on
prior court decisions which have held that fraud violations of the Commodity Exchange Act
require proof of scienter. 2 CoMm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,980 (CFTC Apr. 10,
1980). The majority of cases which have required scienter for proof of commodities fraud
have reached a common result by analogizing to securities fraud precedent requiring proof
of scienter, rather than by an independent analysis of fraud provisions of the Commodity
Exchange Act. See 586 F.2d at 1356; 364 F.2d at 562; 549 F.2d at 31. In Gordon, the CFTC
was correct in not relying on commodity fraud case law since prior courts did not analyze
the language or legislative history of the fraud provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act
as carefully or thoroughly as did the CFTC in Gordon. See id.; 2 CoMm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
21,016, at 23,980 n.34; text accompanying notes 36-171 (discussion of proper and improper
methods of interpretation of CEA fraud provisions).
See CFTC v. Sterling Capital Co., 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at 21,169-70
(N.D. Ga. 1981) (whether rule 32.9 of CFTC regulations requires proof of scienter); Gordon v.
Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,981 (CFTC Apr. 10,
1980) (whether § 4b(A) of CEA requires proof of scienter); text accompanying notes 36-170
infra.
, 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016 (CFTC Apr. 10, 1980).
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that a breach of the fiduciary duty owed by a commodities broker to a
customer constitutes fraud under section 4b(A) of the CEA, even absent
proof of scienter.17 Plaintiff Gordon was a prospective investment
customer who consulted with Philmour Hillman, an employee of Shear-
son Hayden Stone, Inc., (Shearson) investment corporation." Upon the
advice of Hillman, the plaintiff entered into an investment program in-
volving spread trading in commodity futures contracts. 9 The plaintiff
sustained a loss of approximately 8,000 dollars in less than a year as a
result of investment in the commodity account that Hillman had
established for her." In her complaint to the CFTC, the plaintiff alleged
that Shearson had defrauded her in violation of section 4b of the CEA by
failing to inform her of the risks involved in the futures trading program
that Hillman had recommended.4 An administrative law judge in an init-
ial hearing found the defendants liable for fraud under section 4b(A) and
awarded Gordon the amount of her out-of-pocket losses.4 Shearson filed
Id. at 23,973.
Id. at 23,973-74.
Id. at 23,975. In Gordon, the defendant-advisor Hillman used the plaintiff-investor's
money to establish a spread position in 4 short contracts in hogs and 3 long contracts in cat-
tle. 2 Comim. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,974.
The term "spread trading" describes the practice of purchasing one future contract in a
particular delivery month against the sale of another future contract of equal size in a dif-
ferent delivery month, where both futures contracts are for the same or related com-
modities. Id. at 23,973 n.4. See generally 43 C.F.R. 32.92-95 (1981). Regular or "long" trans-
actions involve the purchase of commodities in anticipation of a subsequent price rise
resulting in a profit upon sale. See House Report, supra note 1, at 15, [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5793. "Short" transactions involve initial sale of commodities with the
promise of a future repurchase of the same commodity or contract. Id. Investor anticipation
in short transactions is that the future price will decline and result in profit. Id.
" 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,974. In Gordon, the plaintiff-investor
deposited a total of $9,312.22 in a spread trading account just prior to June 1975. Id.; see
note 39 supra. Upon liquidation of the account in September 1975, the plaintiff received
$1,349.22 in remittance. 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,974.
41 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,973. The plaintiff in Gordon filed suit
against the Shearson Corporation (Shearson) under § 2a(1) of the Commodity Exchange Act
which provides that any act, or omission of an agent of a corporation perpetrated within the
scope of his employment is tantamount to an act or omission of the corporation as well as
that of the agent. 7 U.S.C. § 2a(1) (1976 & Supp. II 1979).
" 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,973. Section 18b of the Commodity Ex-
change Act provides that a CFTC-designated administrative law judge initially hears com-
plaints concerning violations of the Act before the CFTC reviews the complaint. 7 U.S.C. §
18b (1976 & Supp. I1 1979). The administrative law judge (ALJ) in Gordon found that
Hillman's failure to disclose to the plaintiff the risks involved with the spread trading in-
vestment program was unintentional and caused by his naive, good faith belief that no
substantial risk existed. Id. at 23,975. The ALJ concluded, however, that even though
tillman's actions were unintentional, he breached the fiduciary duty of disclosure, giving
rise to a fraud violation under § 4b(A). Id. Without directly addressing the issue of scienter,
then, the ALJ in Gordon rejected the argument that proof of § 4b(A) violations requires proof
of scienter. Id. Finding a fraud violation, the judge awarded the plaintiff $7,963.00 plus 7%
interest from June 1975 to the date of payment in money damages. Id.; see 7 U.S.C. § 18(e)
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for review of the administrative law judge's decision. 3 The defendants
urged the CFTC to re-examine whether the unintentional failure to in-
form a customer of the risks involved in commodity spread trading
violated section 4b(A)."
The CFTC affirmed the administrative law judge's finding that the
defendants violated section 4b(A) of the CEA. 5 The CFTC held that
breach of a fiduciary duty constitutes fraud as proscribed by section
4b(A).4 1 Plaintiff Gordon need only prove that a fiduciary relationship ex-
isted between her and the defendant and that the defendant breached its
fiduciary duty. According to the CFTC, Gordon did not have to prove
that the defendant willfully or knowingly intended to defraud her to sus-
tain a fraud action.
4 8
The CFTC analyzed the statutory construction and legislative intent
underlying the CEA in resolving the question of scienter. 49 Examining
the language of section 4b," the CFTC held that Congress intended a
broad construction of the meaning of "to defraud."5 ' The CFTC noted the
common law distinction between actual and constructive fraud in deter-
(1976 & Supp. III 1979) (providing for award of money damages upon violation of CEA); note
10 supra (CFTC enforcement and reparations proceedings).
11 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,973. Section 18c of the Commodity Ex-
change Act provides that after alleged violators of the Act have had the opportunity for an
initial hearing, the CFTC then may review the result of the hearing and determine whether
or not the respondent has violated terms of the Commodity Exchange Act. 7 U.S.C. § 18c
(1976 & Supp. III 1979). In Gordon, the defendant Shearson sought CFTC review of the
ALJ's determination holding the corporation liable for fraud under § 4b(A) of the Commodity
Exchange Act. 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,973. Shearson contended that the
ALJ erred as a matter of law in holding that negligent conduct, absent intent to defraud,
constitutes a violation of § 4b(A). Id. at 23,975. On review, Shearson asserted that since
negligent conduct is insufficient to support securities fraud violations, such conduct is not
sufficient evidence to sustain § 4b(A) fraud violations of the Commodity Exchange Act. Id.;
see text accompanying notes 65-84 infra.
11 Id. Until the CFTC in Gordon confronted the issue of scienter under § 4b(A) of the
Commodity Exchange Act, no court had considered whether an unintentional breach of
fiduciary duty constituted fraud under § 4b(A).
2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 21,016, at 23,982.
Id. at 23,981.
Id. In Gordon, the CFTC noted that the specific duties and degree of care imposed
upon a particular agent-fiduciary, which give rise to § 4b(A) liability, directly stem from the
nature of the relationship with the customer. Id. As a result of Gordon, then, failure to in-
form a customer of the risks involved in spread trading may or may not give rise to fraud
liability, depending on the capacity in which the commodity broker is operating. See id. at
23,981 n.37 (contrasting different liability when broker acts as trusted agent versus perfunc-
tory advisor). Gordon announces no per se rule concerning negligent broker conduct, but
rather, proscribes breach of the fiduciary duty. Consequently, the issue for courts applying
Gordon will be to determine the existence of a fiduciary relationship between plaintiffs and
defendants.
" Id.; see note 47 supra.
2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,976.
7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976 & Supp. III 1979); see note 20 supra.
" 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,976. 1
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mining the scope of fraud under section 4b.52 Cases of actual fraud, or
fraud at law, usually involve arm's length transactions between parties
and require the plaintiff to prove intent to defraud and resultant
injury.' Constructive fraud, or fraud in equity, however, applies to par-
ties involved in a fiduciary relationship and does not require proof of
scienter.T In Gordon, the CFTC reasoned that because Congress designed
the CEA as remedial legislation applicable to fiduciary transactions, the
flexible notions of constructive fraud control the construction of section
4bA)." The CFTC noted that a non-scienter construction of section 4b(A)
is consistent with judicial interpretation of similar antifraud provisions
of the CEA regulating fraud in connection with the fiduciary duties of
commodity trading advisors." The CFTC concluded, therefore, that proof
of scienter was not a prerequisite to Gordon's fraud action under section
4b(A).5
The CFTC also noted the distinctions between section 4b(A) and sec-
tions 4b(B) through 4b(D)M of the CEA.5 9 Sections 4b(B) through (D) con-
tain the words "willfully" and "knowingly" which the CFTC acknowledg-
ed as prohibiting fraudulent acts committed with intent to defraud,
cheat, or deceive." The CFTC stressed the absence of willful or inten-
5Id.
See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 192 (1963). In common
law actions for fraud in law, scienter is an essential element of proof. Id. Proof of intent to
deceive is necessary to fraud actions at law since monetary damages is the form of relief the
court may award in such actions. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 693 (1980). The punitive
effects and harm that monetary damages may have on a defendant require a stricter stand-
ard of proof for fraud at law. Id. Actual intent to deceive, or scienter, therefore is an import-
ant element for common law fraud actions at law. 375 U.S. at 192.
Id. at 193-94. In common law actions for fraud in equity between fiduciary parties,
proof of scienter is unnecessary. Id. Equitable relief remedies for fraud include reformation
of contracts, recission, and equitable liens resulting in a void of the fraudulent transaction.
PROSSER, supra note 13, at 387-88. Since equitable remedies for fraud do not have the same
punitive effect as monetary damages, see note 53 supra, proof of fraud in equity does not
contain the strict requirement of scienter as an element of proof. See Aaron v. SEC, 446
U.S. 680, 693 (1980).
1 2 Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,976; see notes 3 & 5 supra (remedial
nature of CEA).
2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,980.
s Id. at 23,977.
7 U.S.C. §§ 6b(B)-(D) (1976 & Supp. I1 1979); see note 20 supra (text of §§ 4b(B)-(D) of
CEA).
' 2 COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,977.
'o Id.; see 7 U.S.C. §§6b(B)-(D) (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979) (§§ 41(B)-(D) of CEA). The CFTC
noted that it is a well-established norm of statutory construction that when Congress in-
cludes a word in one section of a statute and omits the word in another section, agencies or
persons construing the statute should not imply the word in the section in which Congress
omitted the word. 2 CoMm. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) at 23,977. See also United States v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry., Co., 220 U.S. 37, 44 (1911); Corn Prod. Ref. Co. v. Benson, 232 F.2d 554, 562
(2d Cir. 1956).
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tional language in section 4b(A).6 1 The CFTC held that 4b(A) governs all
actions to defraud including actions unintentionally committed.62 The
legislative history underlying the enactment of !section 4b supports the
CFTC's literal reading of 4b(A).63 Congress rejected formulations of 4b(A)
that specifically required scienter and enacted the provision without the
"willful" or "knowing" requirements contained in sections 4b(B) through
4b(D).
The CFTC also distinguished the requirements necessary to prove
fraud under section 4b(A) of the CEA from the provisions of section
10(b)"5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.66 To sustain a fraud action
under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule 10b-51 promulgated
thereunder, the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder68 held
that scienter is a necessary requirement for recovery of damages. 9 The
CFTC rejected the Hochfelder holding as inapposite in Gordon." The
CFTC compared the language used in section 10(b) of the 1934 Act with
" 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,977; see note 4 supra (enactment of § 4b
of CEA); note 20 supra (text of § 4b(A) of CEA).
62 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,977.
Id. at 23,979. Congress considered H.R. 7608 containing a proposed version of §
4b(A) of the Commodity Exchange Act as an amendment to the 1922 Act. Id.; see note 3
supra (amendment of 1922 Commodity Act). Proposed House Rule 7608 proscribed knowing
conduct with the intent to defraud in connection with the making of futures contracts. H.R.
7608, 73d CONG., 1st SESS. 32, § 4A (1932).
See 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,979; 7 U.S.C. §§ 6b(A)-(D) (1976 &
Supp. III 1979); note 63 supra.
65 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Act makes it unlawful
for any person to employ any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities. Id. Congress enacted § 10(b) of the 1934 Act in the
public interest for protection of securities investors. Id.
2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,979-80; see text accompanying notes 67-80
infra.
67 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981). The SEC promulgated rule 10b-5 pursuant to a grant of
rulemaking authority in § 10{b) of the 1934 Act. See 15 U.S C. § 78j(b) (1976).
Rule lOb-5 makes it unlawful for any person to employ any device, scheme or artifice to
defraud or engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
425 U.S. 185 (1976). In Hochfelder, plaintiff investors brought a private damage ac-
tion against an accounting firm for securities law violations. Id. at 188-89. The president of a
securities brokerage firm fraudulently induced customers to invest funds in certain
securities accounts. Id. The president then converted the investor funds and the firm's
books never reflected the account. Id. After the suicide of the brokerage's president, the
defrauded investors brought suit against the accounting firm which audited the brokerage
firm's books. Id. at 189-90. The plaintiffs alleged that under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and SEC
rule lOb-5, the accounting firm was negligent in not discovering the fraudulent transactions
of the president. Id. at 190. Determining that a scienter requirement existed under § 10(b)
and rule 10b-5, the Supreme Court dismissed the case since the plaintiffs disclaimed any in-
tentional conduct by the defendant accounting firm. Id. at 191.
69 Id. at 193.
0 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,979-80.
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that of section 4b of the CEA.7 1 Although section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
contains no language requiring willful or knowing conduct,"2 the
Hochfelder Court concluded that such terms as "manipulative," "decep-
tive," and "contrivance" of section 10(b) suggested that Congress intended
to proscribe intentional misconduct.73 Section 4b(A) contains no language
regulating manipulative or deceptive conduct, but only generally pro-
hibits cheating or defrauding in transactions involving commodity
futures.74 The CFTC held, therefore, that, unlike section 10(b) of the 1934
Act, section 4b(A) of the CEA contained no scienter requirement. 5
The CFTC in Gordon also distinguished Hochfelder on the grounds
that the prohibitions of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act encompass both
fiduciary and nonfiduciary relationships. 6 Although section 10(b) applies
to any person involved in a securities transaction,7 7 section 4b(A) of the
CEA regulates fraud in fiduciary relationships.7 1 Since persons acting in
a fiduciary capacity have an affirmative duty to act non-negligently,79 the
CFTC in Gordon held that an unintentional breach of a fiduciary duty is
a proper standard of culpability in section 4b(A) fraud actions.0 The
defendant in Gordon stood in an advisory capacity to the plaintiff on
behalf of Shearson,8 and the defendant failed to inform the plaintiff of
71 Id. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) (language proscribing conduct related to use of
manipulative or deceptive devices associated with securities sales) with 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1976
& Supp. I1 1979) (language generally prohibiting fraud associated with commodities sales).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
7 See 425 U.S. at 197. The Supreme Court in Hochfelder noted that the term
"manipulative" is a term of art connoting intentional or willful conduct. Id. at 199. "Con-
trivance" means a device intended to deceive. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 298 (5th ed. 1979).
", See 7 U.S.C. § 6b(A) (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979); see note 20 supra (text of § 4b(A) of
CEA).
76 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (.CH) 21,016, at 23,980.
76 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
1 Id. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act covers the acts of "any person ... in connection with
the purchase and sale of securities." Id.
"' See 7 U.S.C. § 6b(A) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Section 4b of the Commodity Exchange
Act covers the acts of "any person connected with making a futures contract for or on
behalf of another . . ." Id. § 6b. The CFTC has recognized that those persons effecting
futures transactions for or on behalf of others stand in a fiduciary relationship of trust and
confidence to customers. See Savage v. CFTC, 348 F.2d 192, 196 (7th Cir. 1977) (futures
broker owes fiduciary duty to client); Klatt v. International Trading Group, Ltd., [1977-1980
Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,636, at 22,598 (June 21, 1978) (same).
79 PROSSER, supra note 13, at 534-35.
2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,981; see notes 52-57 supra.
61 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,973 & n.3. The administrative law judge
in the initial hearing in Gordon found Shearson jointly liable with the defendant Hillman
under § 2a(1) of the CEA. Id.; see 7 U.S.C. § 2a(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1974); note 41 supra (§
2a(1) of CEA). The defendants in Gordon did not raise the issue of joint liability in the later
CFTC proceeding. The CFTC, therefore, allowed the administrative law judge's finding of
joint liability under § 2a(1) of the Commodity Exchange Act to stand. 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) at 23,983 n.40.
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commodities investment risks,82 thereby breaching his fiduciary duty to
the plaintiff.83 Consequently, the CFTC held that, absent proof of
scienter, a defendant's breach of a fiduciary duty constitutes fraud under
section 4b(A) of the CEA 4
In CFTC v. Sterling Capital Co.,85 the District Court for the Nor-
thern District of Georgia disagreed with the CFTC's decision in Gordon8
and held that violations of section 4b(A) of the CEA require proof of
scienter" The Sterling Capital Corporation (Sterling) was responsible
for marketing and selling commodity contracts known as "Fixed
Cost/Fixed Maturity Contracts" (FCFM contacts).' The CFTC sought to
enjoin Sterling from selling the FC/FM contracts on the grounds that the
contracts constituted commodity options. 9 The CFTC alleged not only
that Sterling had violated section 4c(C) of the CEA 8 prohibiting the offer
and sale of certain commodity options, 91 but also that Sterling's conduct
violated section 4c(B) and rule 32.9 prohibiting fraud in connection with
the offer and sale of commodity options.2 In determining whether
scienter is an element of fraud associated with the sale of commodity op-
82 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,974. The CFTC specifically has recognized
the importance of disclosure of risk by commodity trading advisors, see note 22 supra, to in-
vestor customers due to the uncertainty involved in commodity investments. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 1.55 (1981) (CFTC rule 1.55 requiring disclosure of commodity trading risks).
0 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,982.
8Id.
2 CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, 21,170 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
86 Id. 21,016, at 23,981.
See CFTC v. Sterling Capital Co., 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, 21,170 (N.D.
Ga. Feb. 20, 1981); text accompanying notes 88-128 infra.
" Id. at 24,776. In Sterling, the "Fixed Cost/Fixed Maturity Contracts" (FC/FM con-
tracts) entitled purchasers, on the payment of a one-time non-refundable service fee, to take
delivery of a specific amount of foreign currency at a fixed price on a specified future date.
Id. A transaction in foreign currency may involve an exchange of cash for foreign currency
or a contract for sale of the foreign currency for future delivery. CFTC v. American Bd. of
Trade, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 1177, 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Congress noted in passing the 1974 Act
that bank regulatory agencies adequately supervise transactions in foreign currency. See
1974 SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 5863. The 1974 Act, however, does not exempt
trading in foreign currency. 473 F. Supp. at 1183; see 7 U.S.C. § 6c(B) (1976 & Supp. fI
1979). Section 4c(B) of the Commodity Exchange Act applies specifically to transactions that
involve any commodity regulated under the Act and that have the character of an option. 7
U.S.C. § 6c(B) (1976 & Supp. III 1979); see note 25 supra. The foreign currency transactions
in Sterling involved contracts for future delivery, which the court concluded were options
contracts, and therefore subject to regulation. 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at
24,784.
" 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at 24,776; see note 25 supra (discussion of com-
modity options).
1 7 U.S.C. § 6c(C) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (§ 4c(C) of the CEA); see note 25 supra (il-
legality of commodity options).
11 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at 24,779; see note 25 supra (illegality of com-
modity options).
1 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at 24,784.
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tions,93 the district court examined the requirements of CFTC rule 32.9.24
The Sterling court initially reasoned that the requirements of section
4b(A)5 of the CEA controlled whether rule 32.9 required scienter." Con-
cluding that section 4b(A) requires proof of scienter, 7 the court held that
rule 32.9 also requires proof of scienter." Since the CFTC had not proved
scienter on Sterling's part in conjunction with the sale of commodity op-
tions,9 the court refused to permanently enjoin Sterling's FC/FM con-
tracts activity.' ° Subsequently, the CFTC moved for clarification of that
portion of the court's order requiring proof of scienter."'O The Sterling
court granted the motion"2 and re-examined the requirements for option
fraud violations under rule 32.9.03 The court looked to the requirements
of section 4c(B)P of the CEA as the statutory basis for rule 32.9.1°1 Based
upon the language of section 4c(B),'0 ' the court amended its earlier opi-
nion to hold that scienter is not an element of section 4c(B) of the CEA
nor rule 32.9 of CFTC regulations. 7 The Sterling court, however, left
undisturbed the finding that section 4b(A) requires proof of scienter. 0
In the Sterling court's initial consideration of the issue of scienter,
the court examined the language of the substantive prohibitions contained
in section 4b of the CEA."°9 The court determined from the language of
the section and from a cursory look at the legislative history underlying
enactment of section 4b that the commission of a fraudulent act requires
knowledge of the nature and character of the act or scienter.11° The court
relied on the analogous fraud provisions of section 17(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1933111 (1933 Act) and judicial interpretation of the
"3 See note 25 supra (discussion of commodity options trading).
" 17 C.F.R. § 32.9 (1981); see text accompanying notes 29-32 supra.
'3 7 U.S.C. § 6b(A) (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979); see note 20 supra (text of § 4b(A) of CEA).





"1 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,170, at 24,788 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
102 Id.
103 Id.
"1 7 U.S.C. § 6c(B) (1976 & Supp. MI 1979); see text accompanying notes 124-28 infra.
"32 Comm. Ftrr. L. REP. (CCH) 21,170, at 24,788.
"' See text accompanying notes 124-28 infra.
"32 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,170, at 24,788.
8 .; see id. 21,169, at 24,787.
10 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at 24,786; see note 20 supra (text of § 4b of
CEA).
"0 2 Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at 24,786; see note -13 supra (scienter).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976). Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933
(1933 Act) makes it unlawful "to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud" in the
sale of investment securities. Id. § 77q(a)(1).
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securities provisions requiring scienter as an element in fraud violations
to buttress its conclusion."2
The district court examined the Supreme Court's decision in Aaron
v. SEC,13 which held that scienter is an element of fraud violations
under section 17(a)(1) of the 1933 Act.' The Sterling court compared the
language of 17(a)(1) of the 1933 Act to the language of 4b(A) of the CEA."5
The court noted that the policy thrust of both provisions is to prohibit ef-
forts to defraud in the sale of investment instruments."8 By analogy, the
Sterling court reasoned that because scienter is an element of proof
under section 17(a)(1) of the 1933 Act, scienter should be an element of
proof under section 4b(A) of the CEA."7
The Sterling court erred in examining the issue of commodity op-
tions fraud under the provisions of section 4b(A) of the CEA. The CFTC
in Sterling alleged that the defendant committed fraud in violation of
rule 32.9."' The CFTC promulgated rule 32.9 under the authority of sec-
tion 4c(B) of the CEA, as amended by the Futures Trading Act of 1978." 9
112 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at 24,787; see Aaron v. SEC, 605 F.2d 612, 614
(2d Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); note 113 infra.
11 605 F.2d 612, 614 (2d Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 446 U.S. 680 (1980). In
Aaron, the SEC alleged that the defendant, an employee of a securities brokerage firm, aided
in violating section 17(a)(1) of the 1933 Act by failing to prevent fraudulent practices of
registered brokerage representative of which the defendant knew. 446 U.S. at 683. A
federal district court granted injunctive relief, finding that Aaron had aided in a violation of
§ 17(a)(1) and other securities provisions. See SEC v. Aaron, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,043, at 91,687 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd, 605 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1979).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether scienter was an element of an
injunctive action under § 17(a)(1) of the 1933 Act. See 446 U.S. at 686. The Court held that §
17(a)(1) does contain a scienter requirement. Id. at 701-02.
114 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at 24,787; see Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. at 701-02;
note 113 supra.
"1 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at 24,787. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a}(1) (1976)
(unlawful for any person to use device, scheme, artifice to defraud in connection with
securities sales) with 7 U.S.C. § 6b(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (prohibiting commodity futures
merchants from cheating or defrauding in connection with futures contracts).
n" 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at 24,787.
Id. The Sterling court was correct in the assertion that both §§ 17(a)(1) of the 1933
Act and 4b(A) of the Commodity Exchange Act prohibit fraud in the sale of investment in-
struments. Id. Because both sections proscribe fraud, however, does not mean that the re-
quired elements of proof for each section are the same. For example, under § 17(a) of the
1933 Act, three subsections prohibit defrauding with regard to investment security transac-
tions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a)(2) & (3) (1976). Although subsections §§ 17(a)(2) and (3) of the 1933
Act prohibit fraud as does § 17(a)(1), the Supreme Court in Aaron held that only § 17(a)(1) re-
quires proof of scienter. See 446 U.S. at 697. The Sterling court erred in generalizing be-
tween § 17(a)(1) of the 1933 Act and § 4b(A) of the CEA concerning a scienter requirement
on the basis that the thrust of both sections is the policing of antifraud and when the
language of the two sections reasonably differs. See 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at
24,787.
1 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at 24,776; see 17 C.F.R. § 32.9 (1981); text ac-
companying notes 28-32 supra (rule 32.9 of CFTC regulations).
"' See 7 U.S.C. § 6c(B) (1976 & Supp. III 1979); see note 1 supra (discussing Futures
Trading Act of 1978 and commodity options ban).
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Since section 4c(B) is the statutory basis of rule 32.9, the Sterling court
should have examined section 4c(B) in determining whether rule 32.9 re-
quires scienter."0 The Sterling court incorrectly equated the antifraud
policy aspects of section 17(a)(1) of the 1933 Act and 4b(A) of the CEA in
holding that rule 32.9 requires proof of scienter."' Statutory language
and legislative history, rather than policy considerations, control con-
struction of federal regulatory provisions."' The starting point for the
Sterling court's analysis of rule 32.9, then, should have been the
language of section 4c(B) of the CEA.
On rehearing upon the CFTC's motion to clarify,"' the Sterling court
analyzed the issue of scienter under section 4c(B)." 4 The court noted that
nothing in the language of section 4c(B) connotes a standard of conduct
requiring scienter for fraud violations.' 25 Section 4c(B) of the CEA per-
mits the CFTC to prescribe, in the CFTC's own terms, conduct
associated with the sale of commodity options.' 6 The legislative history
underlying section 4c(B) indicates that Congress conferred broad
authority on the CFTC to achieve effective regulation of fraudulent op-
tions transactions.'1 The Sterling court concluded that scienter is not an
element of commodity option fraud actions, based upon the absence of a
scienter requirement in the language and history of section 4c(B) of the
CEA. 18
Sterling and Gordon illustrate two methods of analysis to determine
whether commodity antifraud provisions require scienter. The CFTC's
decision in Gordon that section 4b(A) of the CEA does not require proof
of scienter is correct."9 The Sterling court erred in reaching the opposite
result."' The Sterling court inadvertently analyzed section 4b(A) in con-
struing the requirements of rule 32.9.' Since the Sterling court later
'' See text accompanying note 158 infra (rulemaking power of federal agencies only as
extensive as authorizing statute).
' See 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. 21,169, at 24,787.
United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961).
'2 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,170, at 24,788. In Sterling, the district court defer-
red awarding the plaintiff injunctive relief against the defendants until the plaintiff could
establish scienter in accordance with CFTC rule 32.9 concerning the defendants' option con-
tract activity. Id. 21,169, at 24,787. The CFTC, as plaintiff, sought modification of the
Sterling court's order requiring proof of scienter under rule 32.9. Id. 21,170, at 24,788.
124 Id. 21,170, at 24,788.
125 Id.
1" 7 U.S.C. § 6c(B) (1976 & Supp. III 1979); see 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at
24,778 n.7 (text of § 4c(B) of CEA).
" See S. REP. No. 95-850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2087, 2101 (discussing congressional intent to empower CFTC to achieve effec-
tive regulation of commodity options).
' 2 Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,170, at 24,788.
' See id. 21,016, at 23,981; text accompanying notes 133-42 infra.
i1 2 Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at 24,787; text accompanying notes 133-46 in-
"1, 2 CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,170, at 24,788.
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changed the basis for its decision to section 4c(B)"'I of the CEA, however,
future courts may overrule Sterling's conclusion concerning 4b(A) or
treat the conclusion as dicta. Nonetheless, an examination of the Gordon
and Sterling analyses of section 4b(A) provides an important comparison
of methods of statutory interpretation.
The CFTC's decision in Gordon is the proper approach for courts to
follow when interpreting provisions of the CEA. The Gordon analysis
takes into account the factors of legislative history, congressional intent,
and public policy relevant to problems of statutory construction." The
CFTC properly reasoned that a review of the express language of a
statute is a primary means to determine the underlying intent of the
statute's requirements.' In Gordon, the CFTC carefully weighed the
language of section 4b(A), the congressional intent in enacting the provi-
sion, and the remedial purposes of the CEA to reach the correct result
that no scienter requirement exists for fraud violations under 4b(A)."'
The CFTC's analysis in Gordon comports with the method of
statutory construction that the Supreme Court undertook in
Hochfelder."' The Hochfelder Court held that the language and
legislative history of federal securities laws are dispositive of judicial
construction of statutes.'37 The express language of statutory provisions
overrides policy considerations when problems of interpretation arise." s
Accordingly, the CFTC in Gordon relied upon the language of section
4b(A) of the CEA to distinguish the holding of Hochfelder requiring
proof of scienter for securities fraud violations."9 In this way, Gordon.
highlights the fundamental policy differences between commodities and
securities laws. " The CEA and the 1933 and 1934 Acts embody
12 Id.
"1 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-212 (1976) (legislative history and
congressional intent relevant to determining scienter in statutory SEC provisions); Train v.
Colo. Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1975) (policies and purposes underlying
statutory scheme relevant to determine statute's intent).
" See United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (clear language of statute con-
trols interpretation); United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 396 (1867) (language of
statute conclusive of meaning).
1' 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,976-81; see text accompanying notes 49-84
supra.
' See 425 U.S. 185, 197-212; note 68 supra.
1 See 425 U.S. 185, 212-14; note 68 supra.
133 See 425 U.S. at 214 n.33 (language controls construction of federal statutes); accord
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980).
1 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,979-80; see text accompanying notes 65-80
supra.
.. See Bromberg, supra note 10, at 288. Basic differences exist between commodity
futures and securities. See Bromberg, Securities Law-Relationship to Commodities Law,
35 Bus. LAW. 787, 794-96 (1980). Recognizing the difference between the two industries, Con-
gress chose to regulate commodities and securities separately. See 119 CONG. REC. 41335-37
(1973); note 10 supra; note 141 infra.
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dissimilar approaches to the regulation and redress of fraud violations.','
By a reasoned analysis of the different language and legislative intent of
section 4b(A) of the CEA and section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, the CFTC in
Gordon discourages arbitrary application of the policy of securities case
law to commodities problemsY.4 Gordon offers a logical and methodic ap-
proach to the construction of CEA antifraud provisions that facilitates
development of an independent body of commodities fraud case law.
In contrast to Gordon, the Sterling court's method of analysis of sec-
tion 4b(A) was incorrect. The district court in Sterling recognized that
the basis for statutory construction problems is an examination of the
language of the statute in question.' The court then examined the
language of section 4b as a whole."4
In examining section 4b, the Sterling court erred in failing to
distinguish provision 4b(A) from provisions (B) through (D).14' Unlike the
CFTC in Gordon,'46 the district court in Sterling disregarded the fact
that provisions 4b(B) through (D) contain language suggesting a willful
conduct requirement which 4b(A) does not.'47 Although recognizing the
primary importance that language plays in the interpretation of a
statute, the Sterling court overlooked the express language of 4b(A)
which contains no scienter requirement."8 The court also failed to ex-
amine the legislative intent relevant to the enactment of section 4b(A)."9
Had the Sterling court examined the history underlying the adoption of
4b(A), the court would have discovered that Congress deliberately omit-
ted words suggesting scienter from the provision.150 A thorough review
141 See notes 8 & 10 supra. Since securities law provides for implied private rights of
action making the courts more readily available to individual investors, a scienter require-
ment in securities fraud provisions may be a means to limit the number of possible aggrieved
plaintiffs. See note 10 supra. Proof of intentional conduct under commodity fraud provisions
may be an unduly harsh requirement, however, where no implied private right of action ex-
ists and where an agency decision in reparation proceedings is not subject to review. Id.; 7
U.S.C. § 18g (1976 & Supp. HI 1979).
1,2 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,976. The CFTC in Gordon recommended
that courts look to the words of the statute itself, the legislative intent peculiar to the Com-
modity Exchange Act, other provisions of the statute, and the policies and purposes
underlying the statutory scheme. Id. The CFTC cautioned against uncritical application of
analogous provisions or legislative similarities related to the enactment of securities law
when evaluating commodity problems. Id.
"1 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at 24,786; see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 197 (1976); text accompanying notes 134 & 138 supra.
"1 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at 24,786; see note 20 supra (text of § 4b of
CEA).
1,5 2 Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at 24,786; see United States v. Naftalin, 441
U.S. 768, 774 (1979) (courts should construe statutory subsections independently of one
another); United States v. Birrell, 266 F. Supp. 539, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (same).
"' 2 Comm. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,016, at 23,977; see notes 58-64 supra.
", 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at 24,786; see note 20 supra.
149 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at 24,786; see notes 58-64 supra.
',' 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at 24,786.
" See notes 57 & 70 supra (enactment of § 4b(A) without language of intentional con-
duct).
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of the congressional intent underlying 4b(A) would have aided the Ster-
ling court in recognizing the error of its interpretation of section 4b(A) as
requiring scienter. The Sterling court additionally did not consider the
remedial purposes of the CEA that the CFTC in Gordon held to suggest
a broad reading of the requirements to prove fraud under 4b(A)."' The
district court analogized instead to securities law.'52 The Sterling court
reasoned that because both commodities and securities law espouse anti-
fraud policies, the scienter requirement of section 17(a)(2) of the 1934 Act
supports a scienter construction of 4b(A) of the CEA.15' The policy con-
siderations that support a scienter requirement in securities fraud ac-
tions, however, should not control the interpretation of the proof re-
quirements of antifraud provisions of the CEA."14 Judicial reliance upon
securities precedent inhibits the growth of a solid foundation of com-
modity fraud case law and is a practice that Congress has discouraged."'
The Sterling court failed to recognize the unique aspects of provis-
ion 4b(A) and the CEA in erroneously concluding that scienter is an ele-
ment of section 4b(A) fraud actions."56 Although the Sterling court erred
in concluding that section 4b(A) requires proof of scienter, the court's
holding that rule 32.9 does not require scienter is correct. The district
court in Sterling recognized that the CFTC promulgated rule 32.9 pur-
suant to section 4c(B) of the CEA The rulemaking authority of federal
agencies consists of the power to enact regulations consistent with the
legislative intent embodied in the authorizing statutes."' Consequently,
the proof requirements for options fraud under section 4c(B) of the CEA
control judicial interpretation of rule 32.9 of CFTC regulations in accor-
dance with Sterling. The Sterling court found no restrictive conduct
standards requiring intent or proof of scienter, examining the language
and legislative intent of section 4c(B)."19 The court correctly concluded,
therefore, that scienter is not an element of proof for rule 32.9 fraud
violations."'
As a result of Gordon, scienter is not an element of proof of fraud
under section 4b(A) of the CEA. Similarly, scienter is not a requirement
"5 See notes 49-57 supra.
' 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at 24,787.
153 Id.; see text accompanying notes 113-17 supra.
' See note 141 supra.
"' See Preemption, supra note 7, at 41; notes 6 & 10 supra. The legislative history
underlying enactment of the 1974 amendments to the Commodity Exchange Act shows that
Congress supported separation of the regulation and enforcement of commodities and
securities laws due to the differences between futures and securities as investment
mediums. 119 CONG. REC. 41335 (1973).
2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,169, at 24,787.
"s Id. 21,170, at 24,788; see text accompanying notes 123-28 supra.
" Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
213-14 (1976); Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965).
"1 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,170, at 24,788.
110 Id.
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for options fraud under CFTC rule 32.9 after Sterling. The Gordon and
Sterling decisions should facilitate more effective CFTC enforcement of
fraud in the commodity market since section 4b(A) and rule 32.9 no
longer require proof of a defendant's intent to defraud. The remedial
nature of the CEA also suggests that requiring scienter for commodity
options fraud violations might make fraud too difficult for the CFTC to
police and thereby defeat the CEA's purposes in protecting investors."'
In addition, Gordon provides a logical method of analysis for future
courts to follow when deciding questions of statutory construction con-
cerning antifraud provisions of commodities law. Insofar as the Sterling
court correctly construed the requirements of rule 32.9 pursuant to the
statute which authorized enactment of the rule, Sterling also provides
instructive precedent for future courts construing the requirements of
CFTC regulations. Consideration of the Gordon and Sterling decisions
emphasizes that careful judicial scrutiny of the language and intent
underlying commodity antifraud provisions is imperative to better
enable the CFTC to regulate fraud and preserve a sound commodities
market while protecting investor interests.
II. THE INTENT ELEMENT AND CIVIL CONTEMPT IN CFTC ACTIONS
Under the Commodity Futures Trading Act of 1974162 (1974 Act) Con-
gress granted the CFTC broad regulatory control over all aspects of
commodities trading.'63 Section 13164 of the 1974 Act grants the CFTC
power to bring civil actions in federal district court to enjoin violations
of the Act or to enforce compliance with the Act's provisions.165 Typically
courts will issue injunctions or consent decrees6 ' to require compliance
with specific provisions of the CEA. 67 When a defendant party to a
"' See notes 3 & 5 supra (remedial nature of CEA).
162 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1976 & Supp. III 1979); see note 5 supra (discussing 1974 amend-
ments to CEA).
1" 7 U.S.C. §§ 2, 4a (1976 & Supp. III 1979); see notes 6-8 supra (discussing formation of
CFTC); Role of Commodity Commission, supra note 6, at 711-20; Preemption, supra note 7,
at 30-35.
7 U.S.C. §§ 13(A)-(C) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
10 Id.; see Schief, Enforcement, in COMMODITIES AND FUTURES TRADING 227, 228-29
(Prac. Law Inst. 1976). To enforce compliance with the Commodity Exchange Act, the CFTC
may seek injunctions or restraining orders in federal courts proscribing the violative con-
duct. 7 U.S.C. § 13a(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The CFTC may also assess fines up to
$100,000, id. § 13a, and refer criminal violations of the Act to the Justice Department. Id.;
see note 10 supra (general CFTC enforcement powers).
" See Offutt v. United States, 232 F.2d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 988
(1956). Consent decrees are voluntary agreements by defendants to stop activities that are
illegal. Id. When the court approves a consent decree, the court extinguishes the plaintiff's
action against the defendant for asserted illegal conduct. Id. A consent decree requires the
consent of both parties to the action. Id. The requirements of consent decrees bind only the
consenting parties, not the court. Id.
"6 See Dobbs, Contempt of Courkr A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 185 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Dobbs]. See text accompanying notes 171-84 infra.
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CFTC enforcement action ' disobeys a court injunction or judicial
decree, a contempt violation results. '69 Recently, one court has sought to
integrate the express protections and requirements of the CEA within
the framework of traditional notions of contempt.
1'7 0
In CFTC v. Premex, Inc., 71 the Seventh Circuit considered the
nature of civil and criminal contempt 72 in relation to commodity fraud
violations . 7  The court addressed whether civil contempt of a consent
decree ordering compliance with antifraud provisions of the CEA re-
quired proof of specific intent to violate the decree. 74 Based upon the
language of the decree 17' and the statutory basis underlying issuance of
16 7 U.S.C. § 13a(1) (1976 & Supp. II 1979); see notes 10 & 165 supra (types of CFTC en-
forcement powers).
169 Dobbs, supra note 167, at 235-36. The nature of contempt violations, whether civil or
criminal, is a topic of much commentary. See Dobbs, supra note 167, at 235; Moskovitz, Con-
tempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 COLUM. L.J. 780, 783 (1943) [hereinafter cited as
Moskovitz]; Note, The Intent Element in Contempt of Injunctions, Decrees and Court
Orders, 48 MICH. L. REV. 860, 866 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Intent Element]; Civil and
Criminal Contempt in the Federal Courts, 57 YALE L.J. 83, 107 (1948). The distinction be-
tween civil and criminal contempt hinges on the purpose for which the court imposes the
contempt sentence. Dobbs, supra note 167, at 235. If the court's purpose is remedial, designed
to compel obedience of a court order or secure relief for the opposing party, the contempt
charge is civil. Id. If the court's purpose is punitive, however, designed to punish the
violator and vindicate the court's authority, the contempt charge is criminal. Id. See
generally DOBBS, REMEDIES § 2.9, at 103-05 (1973).
1I See text accompanying notes 161 supra, 214 infra. Many courts have faced the prob-
lem of intergrating the provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act with common methods
of judicial relief. For example, courts have struggled with the question of whether the Com-
modity Exchange Act implies a private right of action for plaintiffs. See, e.g., Alken v. Ler-
ner, 485 F. Supp. 871, 879 (D.N.J. 1980) (implied private right of action exists); Stone v. Saxon
& Windsor Group, Ltd., [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,000, at
23,885 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (no implied private right of action); Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co., 481 F.
Supp. 53, 56-57 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (no implied private right of action); Smith v. Groover, 468 F.
Supp. 105, 107-08 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (implied private right of action exists). See also Recent
Developments in Commodities Law, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 986, 997 (1980). Translating
the CFTC's broad grant of authority in the 1974 Act and the general standards that Con-
gress provided for interpretation of the Act is a difficult job for the courts. See Preemption,
supra note 7, at 35.
1 655 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1981).
172 See note 169 supra; text accompanying notes 223-28 infra.
m 655 F.2d at 781.
674 Id. at 782.
1 Id. The relevant portion of the consent decree in Premex enjoined the defendants in
paragraph A(1) from use of the mails or any instrumentality of interstate commerce to
directly or indirectly employ any device to defraud. Id. Paragraph A(2) enjoined use of the
mails to directly or indirectly make untrue statements or omit statements of material facts
in connection with the sale of leverage contracts. Id.
Leverage contracts confer upon the purchaser the right, but not the obligation, to buy
a specific quantity of gold or silver bullion or coins, at a fixed price on or before a specified
date. CFTC v. Goldex Int'l Ltd., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH)
20,839, at 23,440-41 (N.D. Ill. 1979); see 7 U.S.C. § 15a (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (statutory
codification encompassing leverage contracts).
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the decree,178 the Seventh Circuit held that scienter is not a requirement
to establish a civil contempt violation.
177
In Premex, the CFTC instituted a civil action against Premex, IncY.
7 8
(Premex) in January 1978, alleging that the corporation was violating the
CEA by means of fraud and promotional misrepresentation .1 9 Pursuant
to the CFTC's complaint, Premex voluntarily agreed to the entry of a
permanent consent decree enjoining the corporation from employing any
device or scheme to defraud and making untrue statements of material
facts.18 ° In February 1980, a CFTC investigator received promotional
literature from Premex containing further misrepresentations about the
corporation. 8' The CFTC consequently petitioned the district court to
show cause why the court should not hold Premex in civil contempt for
violation of the earlier consent decree.'82
Finding clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's
statements in the February literature had violated portions of the con-
sent decree, the district court held Premex in civil contempt.'83 The court
also required that the defendants pay the CFTC's expenses incurred in
enforcing compliance with the decree.' Subsequently, the defendants
appealed the district court's holding to the Seventh Circuit. 8 Premex
argued that proof of scienter"8 I was a prerequisite to a violation of the
1 See text accompanying notes 194-204 infra.
12 655 F.2d at 784.
" Id. at 781. In Premex, the defendant, Premex, Inc. (Premex), was a corporation
engaged in the offer and sale of precious metals leverage contracts. Id.; see note 175 supra
(leverage contracts). To solicit public customers for investment in the leverage contracts,
Premex distributed promotional literature to purchasers and prospective buyers of the con-
tracts. 655 F.2d at 781. Under the provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, Premex was
a commodity trading advisor. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976 & Supp. I 1979); see note 22 supra; note
181 infra.
19 655 F.2d at 781.
"' Id.; see note 175 supra.
... 655 F.2d at 781. In Premex, the literature that the CFTC investigator received con-
tained misrepresentations concerning the corporation's registration, financial insurance,
and the protective regulatory oversight that the CFTC exercised over the corporation. Id.
The literature stated that the CFTC had registered Premex as a Commodity Trading Ad-
visor. Id. Premex's CFTC registration as an advisor, however, had expired several months
prior to the investigator's receipt of the literature. Id. Premex had not yet renewed its
registration at the time of trial. Id. The literature also assured prospective customers that if
the corporation encountered financial difficulty, the CFTC would transfer all customer ac-
count balances to another company so as not to harm customer funds. Id. In fact, Premex
was behind in processing the posting of customer accounts which rendered CFTC
surveillance difficult. Id. at 782. Additionally, neither the CFTC nor any exchange regulated
Premex's activities as the literature stated. Id.
192 Id.
1"3 Id.
18 Id. The district court in Premex required the defendants to pay $3,102.92 in at-
torney's fees and $979.71 for other expenses incurred by the CFTC in enforcing compliance
with the court's order. Id.
' Id. at 781.
" See note 13 supra.
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consent decree. 8 ' Since the CFTC did not prove scienter, Premex con-
tended that the district court improperly held the defendants in civil
contempt for violation of the decree.'
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit rejected the defendant's argument
that proof of scienter forms the basis of a civil contempt violation.' In
evaluating Premex's claim, the court first looked to the consent
decree.8 0 The court held that the four corners of the consent decree con-
tained the requirements of the document.' Since the decree did not con-
tain language specifying willful, intentional, or purposeful conduct,' the
Premex court concluded that no scienter requirement existed within the
decree.'
93
Second, the Seventh Circuit relied on the regulatory basis of the
decree to determine whether a violation of the decree required
scienter.'94 The CFTC alleged that Premex had violated paragraph A(2)' 5
of the consent decree, enjoining Premex from fraudulent action in con-
nection with the sale of precious metals leverage contracts.'9' The
language of paragraph A(2) contained the same proscriptions as rule
30.03(b),'" an antifraud regulation promulgated by the CFTC.' 8 Examin-
ing rule 30.03, the Seventh Circuit noted that the rule contained no
187 655 F.2d at 782.
'1 Id. at 781.
189 Id. In Premex, the defendants argued that the statutory basis for issuance of the
consent decree was § 4o of the Commodity Exchange Act. Id. at 782 n.3; see 7 U.S.C. § 6o
(1976 & Supp. III 1979) (§ 4o of CEA); note 21 supra (same). Section 4o of the Act generally
prohibits commodity trading advisors, see note 22 supra, or pool operators, see note 23
supra, from defrauding any client or prospective client. 7 U.S.C. § 6o. Premex asserted that
since violations of § 4o require proof of intentional conduct, and because § 40 formed the
basis for the consent decree, a violation of the consent decree required proof of scienter. 655
F.2d at 782; see CFTC v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 286 (9th Cir. 1979) (proof of scienter required
for violations of § 4o of CEA); note 194 infra (Premex incorrect in citing § 4o of CEA as
statutory basis of consent decree).
'90 655 F.2d at 782; see note 175 supra.
.91 655 F.2d at 782.
.. Id. at 781; see note 185 supra. The words "willfully" and "knowingly" evince a
scienter requirement. See Gordon v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 21,016, at 23,977 (CFTC Apr. 10, 1980).
193 655 F.2d at 782.
19 Id. at 783. In Premex, the court noted that the defendants erred in citing § 4o of the
Commodity Exchange Act as the statutory basis underlying issuance of the decree. Id. at
782 n.3; see note 189 supra. The court pointed out that the CFTC had charged the defen-
dants with a violation of rule 30.03(b), regulating fraud in connection with transactions in
precious metals. 655 F.2d at 782 n.3; see 17 C.F.R. § 31.03(b) (1981) (CFTC rule 30.03 now
designated as 31.03); 655 F.2d at 783 n.5 (text of CFTC rule 31.03). CFTC rule 30.03(b) then,
and not § 4o of the CEA, formed the basis of the consent decree. 655 F.2d at 783.
,,' 655 F.2d at 781; see note 181 supra (text of paragraph A(2) of consent decree).
' 655 F.2d at 782; see note 175 supra (leverage contracts).
" 17 C.F.R. § 31.03(b) (1981); see note 194 supra.
198 655 F.2d at 783 n.3. Compare id. at 781 (paragraph A(2) of consent decree) with 17
C.F.R. § 31.03(b) (1981) (language of CFTC rule 30.03(b)).
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language evincing a scienter requirement.'9 9 The court distinguished
language of rule 30.03 from certain antifraud provisions of the CEA
which contain language concerning willful behavior requiring proof of
scienter."' The court noted that the CFTC, in adopting rule 30.03,
specifically stated that proof of scienter is not necessary to establish
violations of the rule.' 1 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit recognized
that a scienter requirement would run contrary to the CFTC mandate
encouraging broad interpretation of rules to effectuate the remedial pur-
poses of the CEA.'0 The court concluded that since rule 30.03, as the
regulatory basis of the decree, did not require proof of scienter,'0 ' viola-
tions of the consent decree did not require proof of scienter. °4
The Seventh Circuit also examined relevant securities law prece-
dent to determine whether a civil contempt violation required proof of
scienter."°' Premex argued that under Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder'0 9 and
Aaron v. SEC"' liability for civil violations of consent decrees may only
attach upon proof of scienter.' ° The Seventh Circuit rejected Premex's
argument on the grounds that Hochfelder and all similar actions under
section 10(b)0 9 of 1934 Act' are private actions for damages."' Since the
plaintiff, CFTC, is a federal agency charged with enforcement of com-
modities law,' the Seventh Circuit viewed the Premex action as a
public enforcement action.' The Seventh Circuit noted that public en-
forcement actions, unlike private actions such as Hochfelder, do not re-
quire proof of scienter.11
4
The court also reasoned that even if the language in paragraph
A(1)"' of the consent decree was similar to the language of rule 10b-5 re-
quiring proof of scienter, 6 Premex allegedly had violated paragraph
19 655 F.2d at 783.
Id.; see 7 U.S.C. §§ 6b(B-(D), 6o (1976 & Supp. HI 1979) (provisions of CEA requiring
scienter).
655 F.2d at 783 n.5.
"' Id. at 783; see 7 U.S.C. § 12a (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (statement of CFTC mandate for
rule interpretation); notes 3 & 5 supra (remedial purposes of CEA).
2 655 F.2d at 783.
2U Id.
20 Id.
'1 425 U.S. 185 (1976); see note 68 supra.
2" 446 U.S. 680 (1980); see note 113 supra (discussion of Aaron -v. SEC).
= 655 F.2d 783.
" 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); see notes 65-67 supra.
'10 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976); see notes 6-12 supra (relation between commodities and
securities acts).
12 655 F.2d at 783.
1' 7 U.S.C. §§ 2, 4a (1976 & Supp. HI 1979); see notes 6-8 supra.
2 2 655 F.2d at 783.
214 Id.; see Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (no scienter
required for public enforcement actions); note 113 supra.
2' 655 F.2d at 781; see note 175 supra (paragraph A(1) of consent decree).
2W 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
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A(2) of the decree."7 The language of paragraph A(2) prohibiting false or
omitted statements of material fact was identical to the language of sec-
tions 17(a)(2) and (3)218 of the 1933 Act.219 The Supreme Court in Aaron
held that under sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) scienter is not a necessary
element, of proof to enjoin violations of the provisions."o The Seventh
Circuit concluded, therefore, that even under the securities law, the
language of paragraph A(2) did not require proof of scienter to constitute
a violation of the decree.22'
Concluding that the district court properly held Premex in con-
tempt,222 the Seventh Circuit last considered whether the contempt was
civil or criminal in nature.2 Premex asserted that the alleged violation
was one of criminal contempt that requires proof of intentional action to
violate. 4 Stressing that the nature of the relief requested determines
whether an action is one for civil or criminal contempt, the Seventh Cir-
cuit rejected the defendant's claim.225 The court pointed out that while a
criminal contempt action vindicates court authority, a civil contempt ac-
tion is remedial in nature and designed to enforce an order or compen-
sate for losses.226 Since the CFTC requested and received compensatory
relief,227 the court concluded that the nature of the relief was not
punitive and that the contempt action was a civil violation.M
The Premex decision is one of first impression combining the ex-
press statutory protections of the CEA with contempt as a method of
judicial redress. The power of the court in sustaining a civil contempt
charge for violations of injunctions or consent decrees is to secure the
benefits of the decree for aggrieved parties.m The Supreme Court has
stated that because the purpose of a civil contempt citation is remedial,
the intent of the defendant in violating the decree is unimportant."O A
majority of federal and state courts have held that civil contempt actions
do not require proof of intent."' The Seventh Circuit's decision in
217 655 F.2d at 784.
218 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a)(2), 77q(a)(3) (1976) (§§ 17a(2) and (3) of 1933 Act).
219 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
446 U.S. at 695.
665 F.2d at 784.
Id. at 781, 784.
Id. at 784.
I2 !d.
Id.; see note 169 supra.
655 F.2d at 785; see note 169 supra.
655 F.2d at 785.
2U Id.
See Dobbs, supra note 167, at 235; Intent Element, supra note 169, at 861.
' McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949).
' See NLRB v. Fairview Hosp., 473 F.2d 1217, 1219 (7th Cir. 1972) (no intent required
for civil contempt); NLRB v. San Francisco Typographical, Local 21,465 F.2d 53, 62 (9th Cir.
1972) (same); Hodgson v. A-Ambulance Serv., Inc.. 455 F.2d 372, 380 (8th Cir. 1972) (same);
NLRB v. Crown Laundry & Dry Cleaners, Inc., 437 F.2d 290, 295 (5th Cir. 1971) (same);
NLRB v. Mastro Plastic Corp., 261 F.2d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 1958) (same).
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Premex is consistent with the majority approach to the requirements of
civil contempt. 2
The court's holding that Premex's civil contempt violation did not re-
quire proof of scienter is sound in light of the remedial purposes of both
the CEA and the consent decree.m The language and structure of the
CEA indicates that Congress intended to establish a broad remedial pro-
gram to insure fair trade in commodities.' Since rule 30.03 was the basis
for the language of the consent decree, 5 the Seventh Circuit correctly
dharacterized the violation of the decree as civil contempt, recognizing
that the proscriptions of the rule are remedial and not criminal."'
The Seventh Circuit's assessment of whether rule 30.03 requires
scienter corresponds with the CFTC's approach to scienter in construing
similar antifraud provisions." In finding that no scienter requirement
existed in rule 30.03, the court properly considered the absence of willful
language in the rule and the legislative history underlying the rule's
enactment.m The court also critically distinguished securities law in ac-
cordance with CFTC and congressional policy, encouraging careful ap-
plication of securities law to commodity problems." 9
The Premex court, however, overlooked a fundamental issue in
determining the scienter requirements for civil violations of a consent
decree. The question of whether civil contempt of a consent decree re-
quires intentional conduct does not depend on the requirements of the
underlying charge.240 Rather, the intent necessary to prove contempt
violations depends solely on the nature of the contempt involved.
24 1
The violator's intent in the act of contempt distinguishes civil from
criminal contempt.242 In civil contempt cases, the requirement of inten-
tional conduct is unnecessary.243 Since the purpose of civil contempt
cases is remedial, the contemnor's state of mind in violating the court
order is not important.244 In criminal contempt cases, the contemnor's
See note 231 supra.
See Dobbs, supra note 167, at 235 (civil contempt violations based on remedial
design of relief).
I See notes 3-8 supra (discussing structure and purpose of CEA); Rainbolt, supra note
3, at 18-20.
2 655 F.2d at 783.
SId.
655 F.2d at 782-86; see Gordon v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 2 COMM. FUT. L. REP.
(CCH) 21,016, at 23,976 (CFTC Apr. 10, 1980); text accompanying notes 49-87, 139-48
(discussion of Gordon's method of statutory analysis to determine scienter requirement).
655 F.2d at 783.
See notes 140-41, 155 supra.
20 Dobbs, supra note 167, at 236. Classification of contempt proceedings, whether
criminal or civil, is determined by the sentence and nature of the proceedings and not the
act of contempt. Id.; see note 169 supra.
u Dobbs, supra note 167, at 236.
24 See id. at 262; Moskovitz, supra note 169, at 793.
u Dobbs, supra note 167, at 263.
2 Id.; see Intent Element, supra note 169, at 861-63.
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state of mind is important.245 The sanctions for criminal contempt punish
the contemnor directly, so proof of scienter or lack thereof in committing
the contempt is a component of criminal contempt actions.24 1 Once the
Seventh Circuit determined that the Premex's violation was civil and
not criminal contempt, therefore, the court could have held that scienter
was unnecessary to sustain the civil contempt charge. In this way, the
Premex court could have avoided lengthy examination of the scienter re-
quirements of rule 30.03 since scienter is not an element of civil con-
tempt.
The sanctions of the CEA are nonpunitive. 247 Thus, consent decrees
stemming from provisions of the CEA will require remedial redress.248
Contempt of a decree based upon CEA provisions or CFTC rules will be
civil contempt, and therefore, will not require scienter. The Seventh Cir-
cuit's decision in Premex illustrates a reasoned approach to incorpora-
tion of the remedial purposes of the Commodities Exchange Act with no-
tions of civil contempt.
PAMELA ANN HASENSTEIN
245 Dobbs, supra note 167, at 262-63.
248 Id.
"4 See notes 7-8, 165 supra (sanctions of CEA). Section 13a provides that the CFTC
may refer criminal violations of the Commodity Exchange Act to the Justice Department
for resolution. 7 U.S.C. § 13a (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
248 See 7 U.S.C. § 13a (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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